Cononie v. Alghny Gen Hosp by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2002 
Cononie v. Alghny Gen Hosp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"Cononie v. Alghny Gen Hosp" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 99. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/99 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                                
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                                          
 
                           No. 01-2024 
                                          
 
                          KAREN CONONIE, 
                                        Appellant 
 
                                v. 
 
                    ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL 
                                    
                                         
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
                   (D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-01376) 
        District Judge:  Hon. Gustave Diamond, Chief Judge 
                                         
 
            Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         February 4, 2002 
 
          Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District 
Judge 
 
  (Filed           February 5, 2002                            ) 
                                          
 
 
                 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
     Karen Cononie commenced this action in the United States District 
Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania against Allegheny General Hospital 
("Allegheny") 
pursuant to Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 
U.S.C.  
215(a)(3) (2001), alleging that she was fired from her employment in 
retaliation for filing 
a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division of the United States 
Department of Labor 
("DOL").  The District Court granted summary judgment to Allegheny and 
Cononie 
appeals. 
                                I. 
     Cononie was employed as a patient-care technician by Allegheny for 
over nine 
years prior to her termination on August 25, 1997.  In April 1997, Cononie 
called the 
DOL to complain that one of her supervisors was altering timecards to 
reduce the amount 
of overtime worked.  This complaint eventually led to an investigation and 
a fine levied 
against Allegheny. 
     On June 30, 1997, Cindy Geary, the manager of the Patient Care 
Technician 
Department, was first notified of the impending DOL investigation.  That 
same day, 
though not necessarily in this order, Geary notified Cononie that she was 
being 
investigated by the hospital for allegedly violating Allegheny's 
confidentiality policy in 
April 1997 and that this investigation had begun in May 1997.  These 
alleged violations 
eventually led to Cononie's termination in August 1997, though Cononie 
argues that the 
true reason for her termination was retaliation for her complaint to the 
DOL. 
     The District Court found that Cononie had made a prima facie case of 
retaliation, 
albeit a weak one, but that she had failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact that the 
legitimate reason for the discharge offered by Allegheny was pretextual.  
Because we 
write solely for the parties, we need not set forth a detailed recitation 
of the background 
for this appeal and will limit our discussion to resolution of the issues 
presented. 
                               II. 
     We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of summary 
judgment.  
See Pittston Co. Ultramar America Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 
515 (3d Cir. 
1997).  We must review the record as a whole and "give credence to the 
evidence 
favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving 
party that is 
uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence 
comes from 
disinterested witnesses."  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 151 
(2000) (citations and quotations omitted).  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  
1291. 
     The appropriate framework for analyzing claims of unlawful 
retaliation under the 
FLSA is the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  The District Court examined the evidence 
and found the 
evidence in support of the third prong of Cononie's prima facie case, a 
causal connection 
between her protected activity and discharge, was "unlikely" to lead a 
reasonable juror to 
infer a causal link.  Nevertheless, the District Court gave Cononie the 
benefit of all 
possible inferences and concluded that the link was at least "conceivable" 
and sufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her prima facie case.  
App. at 12. 
     The District Court then noted that the defendant had proffered 
evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of Cononie, her 
violation of the 
hospital's patient confidentiality policy, a violation Cononie admits 
knowing could lead 
to termination.  Thus the dispute lies with the final step of the 
analysis, whether Cononie 
has presented enough evidence to make a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the 
reasons given by Allegheny were a pretext for unlawful termination. 
     To defeat summary judgment when the defendant has offered a 
legitimate reason 
for its action, the "plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from 
which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's 
articulated 
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action."  
Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 
     In this case, Cononie argues that the District Court erred in holding 
that her 
evidence that the defendant's offered reason was not the true reason for 
Cononie's 
termination was insufficient to make a factual issue.  Allegheny presented 
evidence that 
Geary learned of Cononie's alleged confidentiality violation in May 1997 
when an 
employee complained to another supervisor.  Geary testified that she began 
to investigate 
the computer records to determine if they had in fact been accessed but 
was unable to 
verify the complaint.  It was not until June 29, 1997 that Geary learned 
that three 
employees had reported observing Cononie accessing confidential computer 
files.  These 
facts are set forth in Geary's deposition testimony, and corroborated at 
least in part by the 
deposition testimony of Larry Thomas, Rebekah Scheid, Rudy Lang, and Jeff 
Cummins.  
     In order to withstand summary judgment, Cononie needed to present the 
court with 
some evidence that "must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, 
inchoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate 
reasons for its 
action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them 'unworthy 
of credence,' . . . 
and hence infer 'that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory 
reasons.'"  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citations and emphasis omitted).  
Cononie has failed 
to meet this standard.  She has offered no evidence to demonstrate that 
the investigation 
into her violations did not begin prior to Geary's notice of the DOL 
investigation.  The 
fact that Cononie was approved for a wage increase on June 23, 1997 does 
not refute 
Allegheny's proffered reasons since Geary did not have any corroborated 
evidence of 
Cononie's violations until June 29, 1997. 
     Cononie also notes some inconsistency in the testimony of Thomas and 
the 
testimony of Scheid, of Lang and of Cummins regarding the manner in which 
the latter 
three relayed their knowledge of Cononie's alleged confidentiality 
violations.  However, 
the testimony of the three is consistent with Geary's testimony, the 
ultimate determiner of 
Cononie's employment status, and is not so inconsistent with Thomas' 
testimony that it 
demonstrates any serious weakness in Allegheny's proffered reasons.  
Cononie has 
presented no evidence to cast doubt on Geary's or Thomas' testimony. 
     The fact that Allegheny could not show any instances in which it had 
disciplined 
other employees for violating the confidentiality policy does not lead to 
a reasonable 
inference in favor of Cononie that the treatment of her case was motivated 
by retaliatory 
interests in light of other potential reasons for the lack of additional 
disciplinary actions.  
As Cononie notes, the District Court was not precluded from considering 
evidence from 
her prima facie case in determining whether the proffered reason was 
pretext, but we do 
not find the prima facie evidence sufficient to reverse the District 
Court's decision. 
                               III. 
     For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court's grant 
of summary 
judgment. 
_________________________ 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
          Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
 
                    /s/Dolores K. Sloviter 
                    ____________________________ 
                    Circuit Judge
 
